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The challenges of Belgian prostitution markets as legal informal economies: an empirical look 
behind the scenes at the oldest profession in the world 
1. Introduction 
An extensive body of literature exists on sex work and prostitution, covering a variety of topics which 
include alcohol and drug use by sex workers (e.g., Decorte, Stoffels, Leuridan, Van Damme and Van 
Hal 2011), occupational risks for sex workers (e.g., Sanders 2004a), sexual exploitation (e.g., Demir 
2010; Van Gestel and Verhoeven 2012), the social ecology of vice districts (Weitzer 2012) and the 
working conditions of sex workers (e.g., Daalder 2007; van San 2007). Furthermore, several studies 
have given us more insights into the possible policies towards prostitution and their influence on sex 
work and sex workers (e.g., Jeffrey and Sullivan 2009; Kavemann 2007; Sanders 2004b; 2008;   
Scoular 2010; van San 2009). The relation between prostitution and the informal economy, however, 
has been, as noted by Peršak (2013)1, less widely studied. As argued by Ponsaers, Shapland and 
Williams (2008, 645), the informal economy can be described as “the reverse side of the official 
economy, the boundary between which is drawn by legislation and regulation”. In this context, the 
informal economy comprises all economic activities that are not officially regulated and registered 
(Adriaenssens et al. 2009; Chen, Jhabvala and Lund 2001; Dell’Anno 2003; Dobovsek 2009; Henry 
and Sills 2006; Lippens and Ponsaers 2006; Slot 2010) and ultimately, therefore, taxed (Ponsaers 
2013). As a result, enforcement of regulation (focused on compliance) has an important role in 
determining the boundaries between formality and informality. According to this definition, all non-
regulated, non-registered and non-taxed prostitution forms part of the informal economy (for more 
detail see Peršak 2013). For the purposes of this article, prostitution is defined as making oneself 
available for the performance of sexual acts with another person for remuneration (see Daalder 2007, 
21)
2
.  
The present article aims to contribute to this under-researched domain. Additionally, it aims to feed 
the policy debate with empirical results. As contended by Huisman and Kleemans (2014), the ever-
recurring debate on the legalization of prostitution is partly flawed by a conflation of normative and 
empirical questions. Also, according to Symons and Gillis (2014), several policy frames lack empirical 
knowledge regarding women’s experiences in prostitution. In this article, we hope to offer some 
empirical grounding for the policy discussion by reflecting on the perceptions of prostitutes and other 
stakeholders in the prostitution business in Ghent, Belgium
3
. In particular, we offer insights into the 
relation between prostitution and the informal economy. To these ends, we address the following 
questions: (1) what are the main characteristics of prostitution in Ghent and (2) how does the existing 
policy
4
 on prostitution influence the existence of informality in Ghent’s prostitution sector? Regarding 
the first question, we identify the motives of prostitutes for starting in the business, their income, their 
perceptions of advantages and disadvantages of the work and different types of informal activities 
related to prostitution.  
                                                          
1
Important exceptions are the works of Sanders (2008) and Verhoeven, van Gestel and Kleemans (2013). The 
latter have studied the presence and extent of informal economic activities within legalised window prostitution 
in Amsterdam.  
2
By using the terms prostitution and prostitute, we aim to make clear what type of sex work we have focused on. 
However, throughout the article, the terms sex worker and prostitute are used interchangeably.  
3
By focusing on Ghent we also fill in a gap in research on prostitution in Belgium, whose empirical material has 
previously been drawn from only Antwerp or Brussels (e.g., Loopmans and Van den Broeck 2011; Loopmans 
and Vermeiren 2009; Van den Hazel et al. 2008; van San 2007; 2009; Weitzer 2012). 
4
 For the purposes of this study, policy is considered as the combination of regulation and the enforcement of 
that regulation.  
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2. Data collection 
The empirical results draw on a qualitative research design (Flick 2002) using a combination of 
document analyses, semi-structured interviews and dossier analyses
5
. In line with previous research 
(e.g., Sullivan 2010; van den Hazel et al. 2008; van San 2007; Van Wijk et al. 2010), interviews were 
conducted with both prostitutes (22 interviews) and experts/key informants (i.e., regulators, enforcers 
and social workers; 16 interviews) active in Ghent
6
. Given the hard-to-reach character of prostitutes 
(Benoit, Jansson, Millar and Phillips 2005; Decorte et al. 2011; Harcourt and Donovan 2005; 
Kavemann 2007; Moffatt and Peters 2004), a gatekeeper willing to facilitate access was found
7
 
(Agustín 2008; Benoit et al. 2005; Decorte et al. 2011; Kavemann 2007; Sanders 2004b; van San 
2007). As this sampling strategy entails a selection bias (van San 2007), we additionally searched for 
respondents on our own account - by going to windows
8
 and bars
9
 (Van Nunen et al. 2012) - and 
through snowball sampling
10
 (Atkinson and Flint 2001; Kleemans, Korf and Staring 2008). The 
sampled prostitutes were of various nationalities
11
 and between them represented all the different 
prostitution sectors found in Ghent
12
, which is necessary to obtain a view of the diversity of 
prostitution (van San 2007). The end result of the sampling strategies (purposive and snowball) was a 
convenience sample, selected on the basis of availability to the researcher (Patton 2002; Decorte et al. 
2011; van Nunen, Gryseels and Van Hal 2012). All but three interviews
13
 were fully and anonymously 
transcribed (Beyens and Tournel 2010) and analysed using MAXQDA 2.  
3. Regulation of prostitution 
3.1 National 
In Belgium, prostitution itself has never been penalized (Stevens 2002). In 1948 the then prevailing 
regulationist discourse (Wetsvoorstel 2013) was exchanged for an abolitionist perspective. From that 
time, exploitation
14
 of prostitution has been criminalized (Van der Vonder and Van Eynde 1973; Van 
Loon 2008). Furthermore, local governments were (and still are) authorised to intervene regarding 
prostitution in order to protect public order and public decency but were forbidden to regulate the 
conduct of prostitution for other purposes (Loopmans and Van den Broeck 2011). Further changes in 
the legislation concerning prostitution were implemented in the 1980s and 1990s
15
 in response to 
several incidents and the highly influential publication by the investigative journalist De Stoop in 
1992. His book exposed in detail the existence of forced prostitution and the trade in women and also 
the shocking lack of adequate reactions to these phenomena, involving a serious blurring of moral 
                                                          
5
 Only four dossiers at the level of the Public Prosecutor could be analysed.  
6
The geographical range of the study is similar to the territory of the local police zone of Ghent.   
7
 This sampling strategy lead to 17 interviews. Furthermore, to encourage participation (and as an expression of 
gratitude) and in keeping with other studies making use of interviews with sex workers (e.g., Agustín 2008; 
Lever and Dolnick 2010), prostitutes were given a financial reward (of €30). 
8
This term refers to premises where window prostitution takes place. 
9
 This strategy lead to four interviews. 
10
 This strategy lead to one interview. 
11
 Belgian (15, one of Congolese origin), Polish (2), Dutch (1), Hungarian (2) and French (2). 
12
Window prostitution (six women), bar prostitution (five women), private prostitution (six women, of which 
two also worked as escorts) and escort (one man and four women). 
13
 Only three of the 38 interviews were not recorded and thus not fully transcribed.  
14
In the sense of managing/running a prostitution business. In the rest of this article, exploitation refers to 
managing a prostitution business. The term sexual exploitation will be used to refer to (forced) prostitution in 
which prostitutes cannot keep their entire earnings.  
15
 Among which was the law of 13 April 1995, which contained stipulations concerning the battle against human 
trafficking and child pornography (Bulletin of Acts, 25 April 1995). Several of its stipulations were amended by 
the law of 10 August 2005, with the intention of strengthening the battle against human trafficking and human 
smuggling and against the practices of rack-renters (Bulletin of Acts, 2 September 2005). 
 
4 
standards, corruption on the part of police officers, manifest lack of cooperation and information 
exchange between enforcers and even rivalry between them (De Stoop 1992). Subsequently, a 
parliamentary inquiry  (Voorstel tot oprichting 1992) resulted in several recommendations (Verslag 
onderzoekscommissie 1994) and the start of a structural, integral and integrated approach to human 
trafficking (De Ruyver and Fijnaut 1994). Today, prostitution itself is still not criminalized but several 
related and ancillary activities such as exploitation of prostitution (art.379 & 380§1 penal code), 
prompting sexual acts in public spaces (art.380bis) and advertising sexual services (art.380ter) are. As 
a result, the Belgian prostitution market takes the form of a legal informal economy (Sanders 2008) in 
which facilitators of prostitution are criminalised but prostitutes are not. The actual labour, the act of 
prostitution, is not regulated and no statute specifically concerning it exists, so that self-employed 
prostitutes have to declare their earnings under other headings such as ‘other personal services’ 
(Acerta 2013; Securex 2013) or ‘escort services and the like’ (Acerta 2013). In theory, prostitutes 
cannot work as employees as this would imply an employer exploiting/managing prostitution, which is 
a criminal offence. In Ghent however, many prostitutes do work as employees, albeit under another 
term. 
3.2 Local 
As the city of Ghent is confronted with the existence of the exploitation of prostitution, a de facto 
legalization
16
 (Weitzer 2012, 79) has been opted for regarding this phenomenon. In the 1990s, a 
notorious gang
17
 held absolute sway over the red-light district (RLD) in that they controlled many 
prostitution premises, organised trafficking of women and enjoyed the protection of certain members 
of the local police. Astounded by the discovery of this gang’s overwhelming power and the police 
corruption involved, the mayor at the time commissioned a clean-up of the local police force and an 
update of the local regulations on (the exploitation of) prostitution. Concerning the former, a unit 
specialising in human trafficking, prostitution and marriages of convenience (Meprosch-unit) was 
founded. In the beginning, regulation was purely a police matter. But over time, under the influence of 
evolutions in the RLD, it has become an increasingly integral approach
18
 in which the tackling of 
nuisance has an important place.  
The point of departure is that publicly accessible establishments where window and bar prostitution 
take place are considered as cafés and that non-self-employed prostitutes working in these premises 
are considered as waitresses. As a result, the regulation of the hotel and catering industry (known 
locally and hereafter as horeca) is applicable to window and bar prostitution (in terms of management 
and employment) (Van Eeckhoutte 2013), which means that the local  police retain some control over 
these businesses through the granting (or withholding) of liquor licences (Van Gaever and Lameyse 
2013). Furthermore, based on a police ordinance
19
 applicable to publicly accessible establishments of 
consumption and amusement (Stad Gent 2007), managers of windows and bars are obliged to declare 
                                                          
16
This means that prostitution or aspects of it are illegal but nevertheless regulated by the authorities. Weitzer 
(2012, 79) argues that in such systems participants are allowed to operate freely as long as they do not disturb 
public order or violate other laws and as long as they abide by whatever rules are imposed on them by the 
authorities. 
17
 The Bende van de Miljardair. 
18
In order to tackle feelings of insecurity and nuisance related to prostitution, several city departments and 
agencies are consulted, stimulated to take preventative measures and/or offer structural solutions for certain 
kinds of nuisance. In addition, residents and managers of windows are regularly consulted by the city, which 
takes their concerns and suggestions into account. In this respect, several actors have a role in the outlining of the 
local policy on prostitution and its related items.  
19
 Art. 1 Police regulation concerning the obligatory declaration of staff employed in publically accessible 
establishments of consumption and amusement, approved by the city council of 16 February 1948, altered in the 
municipal council of 26 March 2007, published on 29 March 2007. 
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both the commencement and the cessation of employment of their personnel within 48 hours of the 
event. In this way, prostitutes working in these establishments are registered at the local police. Social 
workers of the Meprosch-unit invite all new ‘waitresses’ to a consultation session to inform them of 
their rights and responsibilities and to collect information on them. As a result of these regulations and 
practices - and their rigorous application - the local police claim to have a clear picture of managers 
and prostitutes active in window and bar prostitution (Van Gaever and Lameyse 2013). Additionally, 
in order to limit infractions of public order, and thus in accordance with the New Municipal Law of 
1988
20
, the city has imposed specific prostitution-related regulations such as a dress and behavioural 
code for prostitutes (of which prostitutes are in breach if, for example, they solicit clients by dancing, 
gestures or tapping on the window). 
On the face of it, therefore, the local police ordinances regulate prostitution solely in order to protect 
public decency and public order, which is in accordance with the legal stipulations (1948 law and the 
new municipal law). Similarly, by regulating the exploitation of prostitution under a different name 
(horeca) the city does not, judicially speaking, breach any legal stipulations. From a judicial point of 
view, regulation falls within the legal framework that determines what cities are allowed to regulate 
regarding prostitution. Indeed, the city does not judicially regulate the exploitation of prostitution; it is 
judicially adhering to the regulation of the horeca. However, in practice of course, the city is 
regulating the exploitation of prostitution. From this point of view, we can conclude that the city is not 
legally or judicially regulating the exploitation of prostitution, but is regulating it in practice. It is 
precisely because of this situation (and due to the lack of congruence between regulations, both 
national and local, and practice) that a grey area between formal and informal economies is created 
(Ponsaers 2013). Before discussing the nature of this grey area in more detail, we first describe the 
organisation of Ghent’s prostitution sector.  
4. Ghent’s prostitution scene 
4.1 Types of prostitution 
In contrast to other Belgian cities (van San 2007; Van den Hazel et al. 2008), Ghent does not allow 
street sex work (Decorte et al. 2011; Porter and Bonilla 2010), its complete prohibition being 
incorporated into a police ordinance on public order and safety. This seems to be quite effective - most 
respondents in this study believed that street prostitution is limited. Window prostitution is 
geographically restricted to the RLD by means of an urban development licensing system. Ghent’s 
RLD has over 40 window prostitution premises dispersed over four streets with 101 windows 
occupied 24/7 by female prostitutes of more than thirty different nationalities
21
 (Van Gaever and 
Lameyse 2013). It is located in an area that also hosts regular commerce, schools and residential 
premises. As in Amsterdam (Huisman and Kleemans 2014), windows are rented for day and night 
shifts. The rent, known as window money, ranges from €100 to €150 per shift. In return, women keep 
all the money they receive from their clients. Several respondents refer to the ‘hardening’ of the RLD 
since the last few years. This hardening is perceived to entail an increasingly fast turnover of sex 
workers, an increase in East-European sex workers
22
, a perceived increase of pimps and a perceived 
                                                          
20
 Article 121 of this law allows municipalities to regulate prostitution insofar as the goal is to ensure public 
decency and public order.  
21
According to local police statistics, in 2013 the most registered nationalities were Hungarian (283), Belgian 
(91), French (45) and Dutch (43).  
22
 Which is confirmed by statistics of the local police. The same perception (i.e., hardening of the RLD as a 
result of more East-European prostitutes) was also found in Antwerp (Van San 2007). 
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rush of tourists from northern France
23
, the latter of which is causing many problems regarding 
infractions of community order (Van Gaever and Lameyse 2013).  
Outside the RLD, two subtypes of bar prostitution occur: mixed window/bar prostitution and 
prostitution in bars or clubs (Decorte et al. 2011; Van Nunen et al. 2012). In bars and clubs the 
division of earnings from clients between manager and sex worker is predetermined. For sexual 
services it is mostly 50/50. For champagne, managers retain a fixed amount to cover the purchase of 
the champagne (the so-called cork
24
). In return, managers usually supply beverages and necessities for 
sexual services (e.g., condoms, oil, tissues). In some bars and clubs internal rules exist concerning the 
behaviour of sex workers (e.g., getting to work on time) and the time spent drinking champagne with 
clients (e.g., one piccolo
25
 in 15 minutes).  
Private prostitution in Ghent takes on three forms: prostitutes receiving clients at home, prostitutes 
working in private residences run by a manager and massage salons
26
. Similar to bars and clubs, 
managers of houses are responsible for supplying material and advertising. Lastly, escort prostitution, 
where prostitutes offer their sexual services on location, also takes place in Ghent (Boels, Verhage  
and Bauters 2013). This can be organised by agencies or by individuals (Decorte et al. 2011). As with 
private prostitution, the exact extent of escort prostitution cannot be determined as prostitutes active in 
these types are not registered as prostitutes.  
4.2 Sex workers’ perceptions regarding sex work 
4.2.1 Entering the prostitution business: money talks? 
This section focuses on voluntary prostitution, involving women and men who have deliberately 
chosen to start in the prostitution business, as forced prostitution is discussed below. This ‘voluntary’ 
label includes those prostitutes who, as some interviewed experts point out, start with sex work 
because they see little alternative to achieving their goals. Limited alternatives or not, nearly all 
interviewed experts claim that the main driving factor in starting as a prostitute is money, which is in 
line with previous research (Kingston 2014; van Wijk et al. 2010). Of our 22 interviewed sex workers, 
16 cited financial reasons as the main reason for starting and six cited non-financial reasons. Eleven of 
these 16 started with a clear, predetermined goal in mind such as paying off debts, paying for 
relatives’ medical care, having a decent life-style or paying for studies. Five interviewed workers 
started in prostitution to earn a lot of money but without having a specific goal in mind. What about 
the non-financial reasons? One woman wanted to work as a prostitute as she already had many bed 
partners and thought she might as well earn money from it: 
‘Because a girl who goes to clubs and has sex with a lot of men in cars, people will say she’s a 
hooker. But, she’s a hooker with zero money and zero respect. Me now, yes I’m a hooker, but 
with money and with respect. That’s how I see it.’ (SW21-bar worker) 27 
 
                                                          
23
Given the non-existence of window prostitution in northern France and its relatively small distance from 
Ghent, Ghent’s RLD is very popular with tourists from this region. With the recent criminalisation of clients in 
France, several respondents feared the popularity of the RLD would increase even more. 
24
 The amount varies from bar to bar. In one bar, for instance, a big bottle of champagne is sold at €300. The 
worker who drinks the champagne with the client receives €120. The manager keeps €120 for herself and the 
‘cork’ is €60, which covers the purchase of the bottle (including travel costs to the shops etc.). 
25
 The contents of approximately two glasses of champagne.  
26
 Massage salons were not taken up in our empirical study.  
27
 To ensure anonymity, we have coded our respondents. SW stands for Sex Worker. This quote is translated by 
the author from French. 
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Other respondents coincidentally entered the prostitution business owing to circumstances
28
 or chose 
to quit their former job in favour of the prostitution industry. The latter confirms Brents and Sanders’ 
(2010) argument that middle-class women with educated backgrounds also find their way into sex 
work as it is perceived as profitable and convenient. Furthermore, as argued by some researchers (e.g., 
Aronowitz 2014; Huisman and Kleemans 2014; Saunders 2005), these stories illustrate that 
prostitution cannot simply be equated with sex trafficking or forced prostitution. 
As prostitution is more often than not partly informal (see infra), these reasons can be coupled to 
theoretisations for working informally. For most prostitutes, prostitution does not fulfil a survival 
function. Admittedly, some prostitutes started with prostitution in order to obtain - according to 
western standards - rather basic needs (e.g., pay medical care), but most earn more than enough to 
have a decent living. Most prostitutes did not declare their actual working hours or income correctly, 
in order to avoid paying taxes and thus to retain a higher net income. As such, this is mostly in line 
with the voluntarist school of thought regarding the informal economy (Chen 2004; Williams and 
Lansky, 2013). Some sex workers also found the administrative formalities that needed to be complied 
with a burden, which is in line with the legalist school of thought (Chen 2004; Williams and Lansky, 
2013). 
In most cases, after the decision to work as a prostitute has been made, a place of employment is to be 
found. In this process, social contacts play an important role according to sex workers, as do internet 
advertisements and flyers. Remarkably, although several prostitutes claim their sex work is a 
temporary means of income, several sex workers and experts testified to the fact that prostitutes easily 
get used to earnings from sex work. As in other countries (e.g., Edlund and Korn 2002; Moffat and 
Peters 2004), money plays an important role in prostitution in Ghent. In our study, about a third (six) 
of the interviewed prostitutes combined their income from sex work with another means of income, 
either  other employment or an allowance (invalidity, debt mediation). For the majority however, sex 
work is the only means of income.  
In the RLD the ‘standard’ going rate for vaginal and oral sex lasting a quarter of an hour is €5029. 
However, since the increase in the number of Hungarian prostitutes, which started in 2011, sexual 
services (also unprotected) are often offered at lower prices (€20-€40). Evidently, earnings from 
window workers depend upon the number of clients they have, the sexual acts they perform, the 
amount of their window money and the amount they possibly have to hand over to a pimp
30
. Although 
exact prices vary, different bars and clubs have broadly similar prices for clients. These are clearly 
higher than in the RLD: €100 for 15 minutes of sexual services, €150 for half an hour, €200 for 45 
minutes and €300 for an hour31. Two sex workers active in private houses explain that prices charged 
to clients are lower than in bars: €80 for 15 minutes of sexual services, €110-€120 for half an hour and 
€130-€150 for an hour. Here too, sex workers receive half of these amounts. The income from women 
receiving clients at home is harder to determine because their prices vary more and some of them pay 
                                                          
28
 For instance, one woman, having felt socially isolated after stopping her activities as a hairdresser, started as a 
telephonist for a friend who did sex work, progressed to being a manager in a private house and finally, having 
noticed she was popular with the clients there, started as a prostitute herself. 
29
 As most prostitutes either do not wish to divulge their income or claim not to be able to do so because it varies 
too much, we mainly provide rates for clients. 
30
 One window prostitute, working five days a week, admits to earning between €4,000-€5,000 (‘bad’ month) 
and €10,000-€15,000 (‘good’ month). Similarly, another, working two nights a week, earns €3,000-€4,000 a 
month. 
31
 One has to keep in mind that sex workers receive only half of these amounts, which implies that for 15 
minutes, earnings are similar in the RLD to those in bars and clubs (without taking the window money into 
account). 
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taxes whereas others do not. The same holds for escorts: prices cited per hour vary between €150 and 
€300.  
Earnings from sex work are used for several purposes: daily expenses, the purchase of luxury products 
(e.g., designer clothes), body care, home improvements, real estate investments in home countries 
(e.g., Poland) and investments in studies or job opportunities. In this respect, it seems that prostitution 
should not be seen as solely a survival strategy. It can also serve as an advancement strategy, a 
stepping stone to a life with better opportunities (Saunders 2005). Our results suggest that this 
advancement strategy does not necessarily mean that those who pursue it cease prostitution entirely 
once desired advances have been achieved. All of the interviewed women for whom prostitution has 
already served such purposes still work as prostitutes. In this respect, they argue their current money 
from sex work will facilitate future investments. 
4.2.2 Perceived pros and cons of sex work 
Unsurprisingly, these earnings are perceived by nearly all interviewed prostitutes as the biggest 
advantage of the work. Other positive aspects highlighted by sex workers were the development of 
self-confidence due to financial independence, learning the value of money, learning from intelligent 
and interesting clients, gratitude from clients (cited mainly by private and escort prostitutes), 
experiences offered by clients which sex workers would otherwise not experience (e.g., luxury 
holidays, fancy restaurants), the possibility of getting ahead in life thanks to the earnings and sexual 
satisfaction (this last cited by only one worker). In the light of these perceived advantages, it is not 
surprising that approximately half of the sex workers interviewed professed to like their job.  
Of course, in addition to certain advantages of sex work, some drawbacks of the work are experienced 
as well. First of all, in line with international literature (e.g., Benoit et al. 2005; Brents and Sanders 
2010; Kingston 2014), several experts and sex workers point to the fact that there still exists a taboo 
around sex work, that sex work is stigmatized and argue that many people have a mistaken view of it. 
As noted by Benoit et al. (2005), in order to avoid this stigmatization, many sex workers try to conceal 
their work in various ways such as working at a safe distance from their residence or by leading a 
‘double life’. In addition, several sex workers experience physical risks (e.g., aggressive clients), 
medical dangers (e.g., liver problems due to drinking, risk of cervical cancer, risk of STDs) and mental 
burdens (e.g., listening to marital problems of clients, putting on an act towards clients). (See also in 
this respect Sanders [2004a]). Interestingly, although most of the sex workers interviewed claimed not 
to be too worried about their physical safety, the majority of them do take some precautions, for 
example refusing certain clients, having a pepper spray, deodorant, lacquer spray or knife to hand, and 
keeping a lock on the door (escorts). In addition, half of the sex workers illustrated how their personal 
and social life suffers from their work (e.g., relational problems, social isolation).  
4.3 Informality within Ghent’s prostitution scene 
As explained above, the city’s approach is to partly formalise the exploitation of prostitution. 
However, this does not rule out the existence of informal activities in the business. These are discussed 
in this section. 
4.3.1 Partial declaration of labour and income 
As horeca regulation is applicable to window and bar prostitution, women working in these premises 
are supposed to receive a paid wage based on the hourly horeca rate and their declared working hours. 
However, regarding the former, we have explained above that women in windows pay window money 
 
9 
and keep their earnings and women in bars receive a percentage of the client’s expenditure32. 
Furthermore, the working hours of prostitutes are usually not declared accurately to the national social 
security office. A limited number of hours is declared in order to limit labour costs (mainly social 
security contributions) for both prostitute and employer
33
 (i.e., manager of the bar). In this respect, it is 
important to note that, according to many experts and sex workers, most (new) foreign sex workers are 
not aware of this partial declaration. As official payslips are based on the number of declared working 
hours with (minimum) wages applicable to the horeca, the declared income of prostitutes is less than 
their actual income. The end result is that the real income of prostitutes is much higher than their 
declared income, even if employment hours are declared accurately. One Belgian sex worker explains: 
‘In the RLD? All moonlighters. All of them. Nobody declares her full income. Nobody! Nobody 
does sex work to declare the full income.’ (SW11-escort) 34 
In this respect, the lack of prostitution-specific regulation and the application of horeca regulation 
enables fraud by resulting in significant untaxed earnings (‘black’ money) for managers and 
prostitutes. Although this is perceived by certain prostitutes as an advantage, it also has a downside. 
Firstly, the social protection of window and bar prostitutes is based on their (limited) officially 
declared employment and income, which does not result in social protection that is in accordance to 
their actual labour. Strikingly, several interviewed policymakers somehow reconcile themselves to this 
state of affairs, as the following quote from an enforcer illustrates: 
‘So it does not reflect the real situation but it is tolerated in that way by the police, the court and 
by ourselves in the sense that okay, if at least that is declared, at least that is done. In that way 
one builds some basic rights’ (EE2)35 
A magistrate says: 
‘We are satisfied, everybody is satisfied with the declaration of the women’s performances at 
the minimum wage. And in fact we hope that they earn more than €8 an hour, given the type of 
activity they do. So yes, you could say that nearly all situations of prostitution are informal in 
one way or another.’ (EE7)36 
Belgian and foreign prostitutes living in Belgium are divided on this matter: whereas some see their 
sex work as a temporary means of earning a lot of money in a short time span (and thus do not care 
much about their social security
37
), others perceive their sex work more as a real, long term job and 
therefore acknowledge the need to build up social security rights based on that work. In this 
respect, a sex worker explains: 
‘If you work here and there is the horeca, then it’s like, later it’s also gonna count for your 
pension I think and everything. You know, I have insurance… So, it’s just a normal contract. 
                                                          
32
One interviewed bar worker and one club worker explain a daily fee is paid to the manager (which is also the 
case in private houses, according to an interviewed private worker) which is used to cover the social security 
contributions which employers pay for their employees. This fee amounts to approximately €25-€30 a day. 
33
In order to be covered for inspections, many managers make use of documents stating that their employees are 
exceptionally working outside their contract hours. However, these ‘control documents’ are often thrown away 
when no inspections take place. Some managers also de-declare employment of prostitutes retroactively.  
34
 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. 
35
 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. 
36
 Idem. 
37
 Other prostitutes have other means of income (e.g., other work) on the basis of which their social security is 
built and thus do not see the point of declaring their prostitution activities. 
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You get everything. So this is good because when you live here it is good to have insurance if 
we have to go to the doctor and things like that. So, this is good.’ (SW22-window)38  
Conversely, a Belgian bar sex worker admits having a 16-hour contract but working far more than that 
in the bar. Concerning the importance of a correct employment contract she says:  
‘If it’s a normal job, yes. But here I don’t attach great importance to it because it’s a profession 
in which you easily earn a lot of money and in which you can say you’ll stay for only three 
months for instance. And a 16-hour contract? Oh well, for those three months that’s not 
important to me. If it’s a long term job that can last for three years instead of three months, than 
I need a good contract.’ (SW19-bar)39 
Secondly, as some agreements (e.g., bank loan, tenancy agreement) require proof of a high enough 
income (payslip), problems can arise when prostitutes apply for such agreements. As most foreign 
prostitutes (especially the ones who do not live permanently in Belgium) are attracted by quick and 
high earnings, most respondents argue that these disadvantages do not outweigh their black earnings. 
However, one Belgian window workers says the following about untaxed earnings: 
‘It’s a ridiculous system. They know we earn a lot of money and we cannot do anything with 
our money. We cannot buy a house, we cannot buy anything. The only thing we can buy with 
our untaxed money is luxury.’ (SW6-window) 40 
A similar modus operandi is used in private houses, where employment and income are only partially 
declared
41
: 
‘Our work is declared some days, but not all days hey. We have to pay our own social security 
contributions, €30 per day that our work is declared. So yes, if you are declared six days out of 
seven, that is eum €200 a week. Yeah, some days there is no work, other days you’re up to your 
ears in work. So yeah, anyhow you have to pay those €30. And furthermore, declaration of work 
implies way higher costs for the boss and all, so yeah.’ (SW13-private)42 
Three of the interviewed  self-employed prostitutes (private and escort) acknowledged not declaring 
their prostitution activities at all (for varying reasons such as receiving an allowance). Five others 
claimed to work semi-formally in that they have all the necessary documents to work as self-employed 
but do not declare their full income from prostitution. 
4.3.2 Pimping 
A general consensus exists among different categories of respondents as to the presence of pimping, 
which in this article refers to people (pimps) living from the earnings of prostitutes
43
. Especially in the 
                                                          
38
 This quote is not translated but reflects the words of the respondent. 
39
 This quote is translated by the author from French. 
40
 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. 
41
 One respondent working in a private house additionally explains how her manager abuses the system of 
temporary unemployment. This system means that if the employee does not receive his/her wages during the 
period of unemployment (e.g., for economic reasons) s/he can - under certain conditions - benefit from an 
unemployment allowance. In this way, an undeserved allowance is combined with earnings from prostitution (as 
the prostitutes continue working instead of being unemployed). 
42
 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. 
43
Pimping has no legal definition. However, if pimps are prosecuted, this is usually done on the basis of art. 380, 
1°, 4° of the penal code (exploitation of prostitution) or (to a lesser extent) the stipulations concerning human 
trafficking (art. 433quinquies §1). 
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RLD
44
, many girls are believed to have pimps, which is somehow striking given the frequent presence 
of the police in the area and their clear view of the RLD (cf., registration of managers and prostitutes, 
visible concentration of window prostitution). But one magistrate explained how certain characteristics 
of the RLD (e.g., rapid assessment of the popularity of a girl, few intermediaries, low threshold for 
clients) still make it an attractive sphere of activity for pimps. Importantly, usually managers of 
prostitution businesses are not pimps themselves. Our interviews with enforcers and our dossier 
analyses indicate that pimping also takes place in other types of prostitution, notably escort and bar 
prostitution.  
In line with Demir (2010), several modi operandi for getting women into prostitution are disclosed by 
our respondents. First, some foreign women are believed to be tricked into prostitution under false 
promises of a job in, for instance, cleaning or fruit farming. Second, others are believed to realise they 
will be offered a job in prostitution but not be aware of the working conditions (e.g., handing over 
earnings, long working hours). The third possibility is the so-called loverboy method (also applied to 
Belgian victims), in which pimps are believed to deliberately pick out vulnerable women (e.g., young 
foreign women having a family to support, those living in poor neighbourhoods and/or with limited 
education) to enhance the chances that they will fall into their trap (see also van San and Bovenkerk 
2013).  
Once victims are in the hands of pimps, several methods are used to keep them in line. They can be 
put under pressure to continue working or to obey the pimp by his (threatening to) exercise(ing) 
physical violence on the victim and her family in the home country. In addition, some girls have been 
made addicted to drugs and hence need their pimp who also functions as their dealer. Loverboys can 
also threaten to inform the girl’s family about her activities. In line with Harcourt and Donovan’s 
(2005) findings, women can also be forced to work extra shifts when they have not earned enough 
money. In this context, they often work below the normal price or procure unprotected sexual services 
in order to obtain the required earnings, which in turn affects business in the RLD generally
45
. This is 
illustrated by a Polish window worker: 
‘The problem is that they [Hungarians] do a lot of things for less money. They don’t use a 
condom very often. Maybe I get fewer clients because of that. I open the door and I hear a lot of 
stupid questions about kissing, sucking without condom, and this kind of thing. It’s annoying.’ 
(SW9-window)
46
 
One enforcer explains how pimps do not always need to exert pressure on their victims: 
‘They’re usually unlettered if they come from there [eastern Europe], because they have not 
finished school. They don’t speak the language, they know nothing here. What can they do? 
Where can they go to? So, they [the pimps] don’t have to exert pressure. They just say: “okay, 
you want to earn money? Fine, go your own way. Ah, but you can’t? Fine, I will help you, but 
then you need to hand me over so much money”. That’s not real pressure, is it.’ (EE5)47 
                                                          
44
 With regard to the police, this might be partly attributable to the finding that they have less knowledge of 
private and escort prostitution. In this respect, the dark number is higher for these types of prostitution.  
45
 E.g., unfair competition for other prostitutes, spread of sexual transmitted diseases, clients asking for lower 
prices and unprotected sex. The same has been reported in Antwerp’s RLD (Van San 2007). 
46
 This quote is not translated but reflects the words of the respondent. 
47
 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. See also van San and Bovenkerk (2013) for more nuanced 
findings on pimping in Amsterdam’s RLD.  
 
12 
In contradiction to the findings of Verhoeven et al. (2013), the window prostitutes interviewed claimed 
pimps do not sabotage their own work directly (e.g., by demanding protection money or by barring 
clients from entering). Apart from taking money from them, some respondents attribute a protective 
role to pimps. However, this is not confirmed by prostitutes working in the RLD: 
‘Maybe years before, the pimps, when you see they could make something. But now if you see, 
they all look like clochards and everything you know. They can’t do anything… They only 
come, they only bring them [girls] here and take the money. But I don’t think so they protect 
them. No nono! If you see them, come on! They don’t look like they can protect. Maybe if the 
girl cannot make money, they beat the girl. But to make problems with the clients? I don’t think 
so.’ (SW22-RLD)48 
At the time of writing, victims in Ghent are predominantly East-European (Bulgarian gypsies, 
Albanian and Hungarian girls). According to some interviewed policymakers, many victims do not 
consider themselves victims because they (1) share in the luxurious lifestyle of their ‘boyfriend’, (2) 
earn more than in their home country, even after handing over (a part of) their earnings
49
, and/or (3) 
believe they will be permitted to keep their earnings one day. Nevertheless, the window prostitutes 
interviewed claimed victims are easily identifiable by the long hours they work and the fact that they 
look sad. Unfortunately, as victims are not often likely to press charges (cf. no perception of 
victimhood, fear of pimp, fear of police), investigations and prosecution of pimps is hampered. As a 
result, the continuation of pimping is more the result of enforcement difficulties than the direct result 
of the local regulatory approach to prostitution. Although legal stipulations are available to tackle 
pimping, enforcement of these regulatory measures is impeded. In this respect, policy does have an 
influence on this type of informality in that certain difficulties in proving pimping are partly 
responsible for the continuation of the phenomenon.  
4.3.3 Ancillary activities and their participants 
In line with previous research on prostitution and informality (Sanders 2008; Verhoeven et al. 2013), 
several ancillary activities regarding prostitution exist in Ghent: real estate and horeca; shopping 
services; accounting and advertising. Unfortunately, as a number of investigations were running 
during the empirical phase of our study, little information on this topic was shared by enforcers for 
fear of undermining the investigations. In any case, informal participants other than pimps rarely 
interest the detective enforcers active in prostitution. Furthermore, it is, astonishingly, only in the last 
three years that the prostitution business has become a domain of interest for the public prosecutor (a 
specific reason for this could not be given by our respondents). As a result, enforcers have limited 
knowledge regarding these ancillary activities and its participants.  
Real estate managers and owners of windows rent their premises to managers knowing very well the 
uses to which they will be put, thus facilitating prostitution and its exploitation and earning money 
from it. The same holds for the manager of the window: he/she receives money for his window, 
knowing very well this is used to lure clients for prostitution. A manager of a bar has an even more 
direct income from prostitution: he/she retains about half of the money paid by clients for sexual 
services and refreshments in the bar. Unsurprisingly, earnings from rents are believed to be only 
partially declared.  
                                                          
48
 This quote is not translated but reflects the words of the respondent. It could be that the men the sex worker 
refers to in this quote are not the actual pimps but the helpers of the pimps (van San and Bovenkerk 2013). 
49
 The amount of money victims have to hand over to their pimps is highly variable.  
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Near the RLD, some regular cafés are renowned for the presence of pimps. In line with the findings of 
Verhoeven et al. (2013), these cafés offer the perfect opportunity for pimps to stay close to ‘their’ 
prostitutes while they are working. As also found by Verhoeven et al. (2013), shopping boys offer 
their services to prostitutes in the RLD in exchange for a (small) remuneration. They perform various 
tasks such as taking laundry to a local launderette, running errands (e.g., getting condoms or 
cigarettes) or accompanying women home or to their car after their shifts to offer them some 
protection against potential thieves. Another ancillary activity involves accountants and accounting 
agencies. They, of course, often perform legitimate tasks such as offering support to bookkeeping. 
However, three interviewed private and escort prostitutes recounted working (or having worked in the 
past) with an accountant who determines the amount of income from prostitution that should be 
declared to the government. Similarly, a bar manager confirms her administrative work is done 
entirely by her accountant, who, she argues, is an expert in the prostitution business. According to 
these respondents, the accountants are very well aware of their facilitating role in income tax fraud. 
According to art.380ter of the penal code, advertising for prostitution is not allowed. Nevertheless, 
private sex workers and escorts advertise their services on websites. One Belgian newspaper is 
infamous for its advertisements for sexual services. A private worker explained how she pays an 
intermediary in cash who in turn makes sure the newspaper publishes the advertisement. In this way, 
no official invoices linking the newspaper to sex workers are traceable.  
5. The influence of policy on informality 
5.1 Enforcement 
Before discussing the influence of the policy, the way in which the regulation is enforced should be 
clarified. The trauma of the 1990s (see 3.1 above) still has an influence on the workings of the police. 
Regarding the local police, only members of the specialised Meprosch-unit are authorised to conduct 
inspections in Ghent’s prostitution premises. The purpose of this restriction is to prevent collaboration 
between police officers and managers/exploiters
50
. However, it is possible that it could actually 
facilitate such collaboration because it means that a very limited number of police officers are in 
regular contact with managers. In order for the unit-members not to build up informal relationships 
with managers and prostitutes (which was found in the UK by Sanders [2005] and Kingston [2014]) 
and not to relapse into the mistakes of the past, a thorough control system is needed. It is with this 
danger in mind that, although the federal police normally focus on phenomena which extend beyond 
the geographical boundaries of the local police (in which the RLD falls; Van Gaever and Lameyse 
2013), they also conduct controls in the RLD on the basis of an informal arrangement between federal 
and local police: 
‘Because we consider that a bit as the control of the control. Because if everything were to be 
done by the local police and the same people were to go to the same places over and over again, 
it might give occasion for comments in the press or for certain people to abuse that… But it is 
considered as a way of avoiding overstepping one’s bounds as everybody here is still left with 
the trauma of ‘Ze zijn zo lief, meneer51’ in the nineties.’ (EE5)52 
Notwithstanding this ‘control of the control’, control mechanisms within the local police could be 
beneficial (e.g., a rotation system, informing team leaders of each control conducted, thorough 
screening of new unit members) as the federal police do not monitor the RLD systematically. 
                                                          
50
 One exception exists: in cases of emergency calls, members of intervention teams can also enter the premises. 
51
 This is the title of De Stoop’s book.  
52
 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. 
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Furthermore, the monopoly of the Meprosch-unit implies a limited local police capacity for checking 
the prostitution sector
53
.  
In line with the response to the historical events, human trafficking and sexual exploitation have since 
2004 been officially regarded as criminal phenomena needing the prior attention of the police in the 
four-year national safety plans. Accordingly, prostitution markets receive prior attention in the form of 
regular administrative and judicial inspections and monitoring from both the Meprosch-unit and the 
specialised unit of the federal police. Importantly, the Meprosch-unit concentrates on visible 
prostitution, specifically on the RLD, for several reasons. Evidently, the RLD contains a visible 
concentration of window prostitution, which is located near the centre of the city. It could also be 
described as a problem area, given the presence of nuisance and pimps. Concerning the former, 
research in the UK has equally revealed that police action regarding prostitution markets is related to 
the presence of nuisance (Kingston 2014). Concerning the latter, a smouldering fear still exists that 
history will repeat itself. This core attention towards the RLD does not rule out inspections of hidden 
prostitution (private and escort). Of course, as these types are more difficult to trace (one needs to 
search advertisements on the internet and in newspapers), preparation of these inspections requires 
more time and effort. 
The prostitution markets receive little attention from other enforcement agencies such as the tax office 
and social inspectorate services. Social inspectorate services focus on labour relations and on the 
accurate declaration of employment, and thus do not monitor the self-employed. The agency checking 
the payment of social security contributions of the self-employed does not specifically focus on 
prostitutes. Furthermore, according to a magistrate, up until three years before the time of writing, the 
office of the public prosecutor did not focus on the prostitution sector. This is an astonishing omission 
in view of the official priority given to human trafficking in the national safety plan (illustrating a lack 
of continuity between detection and prosecution), but even more astonishing given the city’s specific 
history with sexual exploitation and the huge policy implications of its uncovering (cf. the start of a 
structural, integral and integrated approach to human trafficking). Currently, exploitation of 
prostitution is tolerated by the police and public prosecutor insofar as it (1) entails purely the 
managing of prostitution businesses, (2) does not include serious exploitation of women and (3) does 
not impact too seriously on community order. By selectively enforcing the regulation concerning 
exploitation, local authorities partially permit the existence and continuation of an illegal phenomenon 
(i.e., managing prostitution business). As noted above, several difficulties exist in tackling pimping 
and sexual exploitation. Nevertheless, two of the window workers interviewed expressed outrage 
about the obvious presence of pimps in the area, as the following quote illustrates: 
‘I don’t understand why the police do nothing. But I hope they are waiting for the right time? 
It’s also possible. You know, that is, I think it’s everywhere, doesn’t matter where you are. 
Mostly there where you have girls who work in prostitution, you also have pimps who are living 
from the girls. So it’s like a symbiosis or something like this. But never in my life, and I’m 
working quite a long time, I didn’t see this so official like I see here in Ghent. They are just 
walking you know every day and they don’t shame themselves, you know.’ (SW9-window)54 
5.2 The influence of the policy on the choices of workers  
As explained above, the chosen policy on prostitution determines to what extent it forms a part of the 
informal economy and we have illustrated how the prostitution market in Ghent forms part of a legal 
                                                          
53
The unit consists of eleven police members and two social workers. 
54
 This quote is not translated but reflects the exact wordings of the respondent. 
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informal economy. As prostitution, although legal, is not regulated, it does not exist officially. 
However, prostitution can be conducted formally under a different term. Our results indicate that most 
prostitutes work at least partially informally in that employment and income is not accurately declared. 
As such, informality is ‘normal’ in the prostitution business. We have seen that financial motives are a 
driving factor in this practice (e.g., reducing labour costs, increasing net income). As Van Eeckhoutte 
(2013) points out, prostitutes and managers are able to correctly declare employment and income 
should they want to. In this respect, the lack of a specific prostitution regulation has no direct 
influence on this type of informality, which has more to do with a lack of compliance from prostitutes 
and managers
55
. We agree on this point, but still feel that applying horeca regulation to windows and 
bars does not stimulate prostitutes and managers to fully declare their employment and income. First 
of all, it offers several possibilities to facilitate informality (e.g., part-time employment, control 
documents, low minimum wages). Given the possibility of using control documents and thus to be 
covered during inspections, it is not surprising some bar managers are not frightened off by the 
potential for their occurrence. Secondly, the horeca regulation is not adapted to the specific 
characteristics of the employment (e.g., method of remuneration).  
However, we do feel that the limited thorough inspections on correct declaration of employment and 
income (e.g., fiscal inspections on declaration of income) and the perceived (by our respondents) 
difficulties in proving untaxed earnings might have more influence on informality than horeca 
regulation. Window and bar workers have not much to fear from police or inspectorate checks, as fines 
for undeclared labour target employers, not employees. However, if employees are found to be 
combining undeclared labour with benefits, they do risk financial setbacks. 
Three of the private and escort workers interviewed point to a partial deterrent influence of police 
inspections. As a result of inspections experienced or the risk of being controlled one day, they have 
officially registered as self-employed, complying with the resulting administrative requirements. 
However, they still do not declare their full income from sex work. According to another private 
worker, the reason for this is that the police do not control the declared income of sex workers: 
‘They are not the ones checking how much you earn. That’s not what they do. In fact, they only 
check if your paperwork for self-employment is okay. They surely can’t sit here with you on a 
chair and see how many clients you do a day!’ (SW1-private)56 
Most other interviewed sex workers who had experienced police inspections in the past did not fear 
future police inspections, mainly for the same reason. Furthermore, they did not mention that potential 
police inspections influenced their choice to partially work informally. Interestingly, most of the 
interviewed sex workers who had no experience of police inspections did not fear them either. 
Checking for the correct declaration of income is the duty of the tax office. However, it does not focus 
specifically on prostitution markets, which is again striking given the sector’s reputation for its 
undeclared money. It is also clear that the visibility and physical accessibility of windows and bars 
cannot impede tax inspections. As such, it is not surprising that sex workers’ choices for not declaring 
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 In the Netherlands, since 2008, the fiscal opting-in system can be applied to club, escort and private 
prostitution (Van Wijk et al. 2010). Although the main aim of the introduction of this condition package 
(meeting the established criteria is necessary for the application of the opting-in method) was to enhance the 
position of sex workers (Bijlagemotie Arib 32211, 2011), it was also intended to enhance the fiscal transparency 
and fiscal compliance of the sector (Taildeman 2010). Currently, researchers are conducting an evaluation of the 
regulation of legal prostitution in the Netherlands, which should take account of this system. For several reasons 
however, we doubt that such a system would be effective in Belgium.  
56
 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. 
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their full income was hardly influenced by tax inspections. All in all, we see that inspections of police 
and inspectorate services (e.g., social inspectorate, tax office) and/or the perceived risk of being 
inspected one day lead most but not all sex workers and managers to comply with administrative 
requirements (e.g., control documents, partial declaration of labour hours, registration as self-
employed) but not to fully declare their labour and income. In this way, the enforcement side of the 
policy partially influences choices of workers regarding their formal and informal work in prostitution.  
6. Perceived pros and cons of the policy 
Apart from its influence on informality, the existing policy in Ghent has both advantages and 
disadvantages for the different stakeholders. In this article, we focus on the perceptions of sex 
workers. One sex worker summarizes the Belgian attitude towards ancillary activities very sharply: 
‘Honestly, I don’t understand the whole concept of prostitution in Belgium. It’s not allowed57. 
But then there’s what you’d call a grey area in which you can do it officially. But it’s not 
allowed. And you can’t advertise, you can’t recruit clients, you can’t put up advertisements but 
we have afspraakjes.com, we have redlights.be, we have all those sites. We have the paper 
where we can advertise. But it’s not allowed. We have window prostitution areas, but it’s not 
allowed. I mean, just what are we doing? I don’t get it. Truly, I honestly don’t get it.’ (SW17-
private)
 58
 
In general, the majority of our interviewed prostitutes are neutral to rather happy with the situation in 
Ghent, mostly because it offers them relative
59
 anonymity (as employees thanks to horeca contracts 
and as self-employed due to the lack of specific statute), the possibility of building up social rights if 
they wish to, the possibility of untaxed earnings (due to slack inspections in this respect) and relative 
freedom due to the lack of specific regulation (see also Agustín 2008). Nevertheless, some of these 
prostitutes would favour the introduction of certain rules regarding hygiene standards for prostitution 
premises and healthcare practices (e.g., mandatory check-ups), the value of which is also argued by 
some regulators, enforcers and social workers. In this respect, future research could study the 
feasibility of introducing a self-regulatory system in window, bar and private prostitution regarding 
hygiene and healthcare, which could take on the form of a quality label (Rijken and van Krimpen 
2007). By calling on the sector instead of the government for such regulation, local authorities would 
not be faced with accusations of falling foul of the legal stipulations
60
 (Vermeulen 2014; Vermeulen 
and Van Damme 2014). In essence, it could be expected that bonafide segments of the prostitution 
markets (prostitution premises where sex workers work voluntarily without having to hand over 
money to some sort of pimp) would adhere to such quality labels, whereas malafide segments (forced, 
exploitative prostitution) would not (Rijken and van Krimpen 2007). Self-regulation could - when 
including for instance stipulations to judge the voluntariness of sex workers - furthermore potentially 
be helpful in more targeted inspections of forced prostitution and sexual exploitation, by leaving more 
capacity to public enforcers to check segments of prostitution markets that do not adhere to the quality 
labels. Such future research should include identification of the attitudes of managers on this point (as 
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 Note: this perception does not conform to the reality as prostitution is indeed allowed. The quote is translated 
by the author from Dutch. 
58
 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. 
59
 Relative, because horeca contracts and lack of statute do not belie the fact that many prostitutes still have to 
live a double-life in order for their family, friends and acquaintances not to find out about their profession. 
60
 Notwithstanding this fact, Antwerp works with suitability certificates for window prostitution which could be 
considered as a form of self-regulation (Rijken and van Krimpen 2007). These comprise requirements regarding 
the premises, applicants for the certificate and managers of the premises. As such, a comparative research 
between Ghent and Antwerp could shed light on possibilities for Ghent in this respect. 
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they would be crucial for such a system to be successful), identifying realistic norms and establishing 
an effective monitoring and sanctioning system. Although this would entail investments from 
managers (e.g., regarding hygiene standards), adhering to certain norms might have a good return on 
investment for them by attracting more, classier and/or generous clients. It might also improve 
relations with local residents and traders (not an economic consideration, but still potentially 
beneficial). As we have not interviewed managers of windows, we do not know how easy or difficult 
it is to find prostitutes to occupy the windows, but an upgrading of the RLD could also attract more 
prostitutes.  
A minority of the interviewed prostitutes - mainly private prostitutes - are scandalized by the lack of 
recognition of prostitution as a profession. In this respect, it is important to note that some of them 
wrongfully claim not to be able to work legally due to the lack of a statute for prostitution, as the 
following quote illustrates: 
‘Now you have the stigma of incorrectness: you’re working incorrectly, you’re working 
illegally. But you carry that with you constantly. You can’t say okay I chose to work as an 
escort and I really don’t care if you are pro or against that, I chose it. But now you can’t say that 
to anyone. Yeah, it’s not done because you’re working illegally. Everybody knows it’s in the 
black, nobody can do it officially.’ (SW11-escort)61 
However, most prostitutes insist on the maintenance of their anonymity, both for financial reasons (cf. 
untaxed earnings) and societal reasons (cf. taboo and stigmatization) and are thus not fully in favour of 
the regulation of prostitution (especially not of the introduction of a special statute) and its ancillary 
activities. In this respect, one sex worker has a pronounced opinion: 
‘If the government deals with us, than we’re up shit creek. We’d better try to keep the 
government out of it. Let it take care of the roads and all that but in Belgian politics we do not 
need a regulation on prostitution. Hey, we’re the ones deciding. Should the government start 
to… oh… what? They’re gonna ask for taxes or what? So for each client that comes, they’re 
gonna say that money is for us? No, no, no! It’s not necessary to talk about a regulation. A well-
managed bar does not need regulation.’ (SW21-bar)62 
More consensus is found among respondents regarding the criminalisation of clients: both experts and 
prostitutes are clearly not in favour of this option. One prostitute says in this respect: 
‘It’s not possible to make the world better and stop prostitution. If they will make windows euh 
out, everybody will move to private houses and then yeah… And how you gonna find that then? 
How will the police find this? Is gonna be more problems because pimps will bring more girls 
and they will work for less and everything gonna go worse because than this you cannot control 
at all. So to say that they want to punish people who pay for sex, this is stupid.’ (SW22-
window)
63
 
Most regulators, enforcers and social workers have an ambivalent attitude to the de facto legalization, 
recognising both its advantages and disadvantages and also its hypocrisy. As a result, some are in 
favour of the regulation of prostitution and its ancillary activities, as they believe this would enhance 
the (social and physical) protection of prostitutes, clarify the legal framework in which enforcers 
operate, increase income for the government and facilitate the detection and eradication of excesses. 
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 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. 
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 This quote is translated by the author from French. 
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 This quote is not translated and reflects the exact wordings of the respondent. 
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Interestingly, Kingston (2014) found similar reasons offered by police officers and local residents (the 
majority of whom were in favour of legalization and regulation) in her study of prostitution in the UK. 
In our study, some respondents, however, feel the time is not yet ripe for prostitution to be put on the 
political agenda in Belgium. However, with the current policy debates in Europe (e.g., the passing of a 
non-binding resolution encouraging the criminalisation of clients by the European Parliament), one 
magistrate thinks Belgium is waiting on policy evaluations in other countries before taking action 
itself. As sex workers are not organised and represented in politics (e.g., no sex workers’ organisations 
striving for rights, no labour unions defending sex workers’ position), their voice is not heard in 
political debates. 
7. Conclusion and discussion 
This article aims to contribute to the under-researched domain of the relation between prostitution and 
the informal economy. In this respect, our results point to an influence of both regulation and 
enforcement on the existence of informal economic activities within Ghent’s prostitution sector and on 
choices workers make in this respect. In addition, although some regulators and enforcers may be 
highly motivated in their work, the general policy is characterised by a high level of hypocrisy.  
Throughout the years following the traumatic events of the 1990s, local regulators and enforcers 
consolidated their approach to dealing with prostitution markets, an approach that enables them to 
have a view over the sector. Given the restrictions regarding regulation of prostitution and its 
exploitation, back doors are used to control the sector. These back doors are not fully adequate for the 
activities they need to regulate. Although the interviewed police officers are highly motivated to tackle 
sexual exploitation and pimping, a sort of ‘laissez-faire’ mentality can be inferred regarding the 
limited declaration of employment and income. Apparently, many experts are resigned to the situation, 
as the following quote from a magistrate illustrates: 
‘Yeah yeah, we can definitely organise a study day on that topic and talk about it all day long, 
but we’re confronted with a reality for which a policy needs to be deployed one way or another 
and that’s just the way it has been done here. Eh, critical questions are always possible, question 
marks are always possible. We’re aware of that.’ (EE7)64 
This resignation appears to be justified by referring to the need to ‘establish limited social rights’ and 
the need to ‘have a view on the sector’. However, there is an element of hypocrisy and/or insufficiency 
in both justifications. Notwithstanding the fact that many prostitutes gain a lot in the short term by 
avoiding taxes and social security contributions, their (limited) social rights are not in balance with the 
work that they perform. Furthermore, they will not be adequately rewarded at the end of their careers 
(e.g., in terms of pension) for the hard work they have done. Social security and labour law, the two 
main tools to ensure the protection of workers, are not sufficiently enforced and thus fail to achieve 
their goals. Although the fraudulent practices are an open secret, they are maintained by the slack 
enforcement of social law, which partly results from a lack of political will to intervene in the sector. It 
is argued by social inspectors interviewed that investigations by social inspectorates into prostitution 
have a low return on investment (see also Huisman and Kleemans [2014] and Rickles and Ong 
[2010]). This is mainly attributed to the difficulties of proving undeclared labour, which indicates that 
social law - which was promoted by the parliamentary inquiry as an important tool in controlling the 
prostitution sector - comes up against its limits when faced with informality. The auditing of 
prostitution markets does not yield enough return for the individual social inspector (who is partly 
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 This quote is translated by the author from Dutch. 
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assessed on obtained results) or for the government (re-claimed contributions). But… at least 
prostitutes have got some basic social rights! 
Concerning the second justification, visibility itself is insufficient in tackling undeclared labour and 
pimping. Admittedly, the difficulties in proving pimping have little to do with the way the de facto 
legalisation operates (see, for instance, Boels and Ponsaers [2011] on the difficulties of proving human 
trafficking in Ghent). Nevertheless, the de facto legalisation does not offer enough tools to 
successfully combat these phenomena. In this respect, one can seriously doubt the influence of the 
obligation of ‘waitresses’ to register in combating forced prostitution as they are not required to 
present themselves in person at the police station - it is only necessary for managers to hand over 
copies of the women’s identity cards. This practice also does little to eradicate illegal employment. All 
in all, visibility is necessary but insufficient to combat informality. At the time of writing, the city is 
seriously pondering alternatives for its local regulation of prostitution as it is confronted with many 
incidents of disorder in the RLD and a residents’ association which is putting a lot of pressure on the 
mayor. As this sector is characterised by a susceptibility to exploitation, this hypocrisy is all the more 
astounding.  
The article has also attempted to contribute to the policy debate on prostitution by offering some 
insights into the perceptions of prostitutes, who are one of the most important though often forgotten 
voices in the debate, regarding their work and its policy. Our results indicate prostitution can be opted 
for voluntarily, both for financial and non-financial reasons. Women starting with prostitution for 
financial reasons often consider other alternatives, but in the end freely choose prostitution. Of course, 
this finding does not deny the existence of forced prostitution and sexual exploitation. It furthermore 
does not mean that prostitutes do not experience difficulties regarding their work. Our empirical 
results, however, do highlight the fact that prostitution can certainly not, by definition, be equated with 
violence, exploitation, coercion or male domination, as is done by supporters of the oppression 
paradigm on prostitution (Symons and Gillis 2014; Weitzer 2012). In this context, it is not surprising 
that no support was found for the criminalisation of clients, as this view is based on this oppression 
paradigm. Rather, prostitutes attach importance to building up social rights, anonymity, untaxed 
earnings, relative freedom, tackling pimping, hygiene and healthcare. The last two of these features 
are, however, omitted in Ghent’s local regulation. Other stakeholders also refer to the need to limit the 
nuisances related to prostitution.  
This empirical study has some limitations. One is the non-random, small sample size (Benoit et al. 
2005), which is why we would encourage more and broader empirical research on the perceptions of 
prostitutes regarding policy on prostitution. Furthermore, some might doubt the validity of taking the 
words of interviewed sex workers at face value because putting on a show is an essential part of their 
job. We acknowledge that many prostitutes put on an act, but we do not think this diminishes the value 
of our research. On the contrary, as we are interested in the subjective perceptions of prostitutes, 
interviewing them is an essential method (Newburn 2007). How could one learn something about 
prostitutes’ perspectives without including them as respondents? Moreover, we are interested in 
prostitutes’ work-related perceptions, not in their private lives. Exactly this private life is what is kept 
hidden from people who contact prostitutes in their working roles. Thirdly, (female) researchers are 
not to be equated with (male) clients as they approach prostitutes for very different goals. 
Furthermore, prostitutes can benefit from studies highlighting their perceptions of their work and its 
policy. And if prostitutes prefer to remain silent about their work, they can simply refuse to participate 
in empirical studies. Lastly, some congruence can be found between the results of this study and the 
story of an ex-escort agent who came out of the shadows and wrote a popular book about his 
experiences in the prostitution business (Geets 2013). All in all, several points can answer the 
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abovementioned criticisms. We acknowledge that we have not been able to reach prostitutes who 
admit working with a pimp. However, thanks to triangulation, reliable information on pimping has 
been found. No systematic statistical data regarding inspections of the prostitution sector could be 
retrieved at the social inspectorate services. As prostitution is not recognised as a separate economic 
sector, data are registered under the term ‘horeca’. In this respect, the lack of specific data is created 
by the policy. As a result, the prostitution business remains invisible to policymakers. In an era when 
inspectors - and by extension enforcement generally - are judged on data (e.g., number of inspections, 
number of positive results) this invisibility is startling. Fortunately, some compensation can be found 
from the federal police, who have recently started their own registration method for the prostitution 
business
65
. 
In conclusion, it is necessary to overcome a purely normative attitude to prostitution and look at 
empirical data to feed the policy debate. Given the varying interests and preferences of different 
stakeholders (Weitzer 2012), prostitution is notoriously difficult for authorities to manage. 
Nevertheless, it is important to identify the viewpoints of all stakeholders. Sex workers are often 
forgotten in empirical research, although they play a key role. Similarly, managers of prostitution 
premises are not to be neglected either. In this respect, more systematic research should be conducted 
to make an evidence-based policy possible. 
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